Lloyd D. Sutton et al v. Nick Marvidikis et al : Reply Brief of Defendants and Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1957
Lloyd D. Sutton et al v. Nick Marvidikis et al : Reply
Brief of Defendants and Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Edward Sheya; Counsel for Appellants;
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Sutton v. Marvidikis, No. 8587 (Utah Supreme Court, 1957).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2702
JltVERSITY. 01 
0CT31 195; 
· Case No. 8587 , . J.tr.W 
ULOYD D. SUTTON, HARVEY L . 
. ~NDALL, . GALE V. BARNEY, 
arid P f\. UL ANELLA, a co-partner-
•$hip, 'doing business under the name 
.'fl,nd style of BLUE FLAME COAL 
COMPAN!, 
. Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
NJcKtMARVIDIKIS, FAYE OL-
··$EN, CLARON GODLING, MALlO 
PECORELLI, FRANK SACCO, and 
an :others engaged in the picketing of 
the coal mine of the Blue Flame Coal 
Co., & UNITED MINE WORKERS 
OF· AMERICA, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
AND APPELLANTS 
EDWARD SHEYA 
Counsel for Appellants 
Bonomo Building 
Price, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT________________________________ 1 
PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT 
REPLY TO POINT 1------------------------------------------------------------------------ 16 
THE 'TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE 
AN INJUNCTION IN THIS CASE REGARDLESS OF 
THE FEDERAL LAW. 
REPLY TO POINT 3---------------------------------------------------------------------- 28 
THE PICKETING HEREIN WAS NOT PEACEFUL, 
AND WAS FOR AN UNLAWFUL PURPOSE. 
REPLY TO POINT 4-------------------------------------------------------------------- 33 
NOT ALL PEACEFUL PICKETING IS THE LEGI-
TIMATE EXERCISE OF FREE SPEECH, AND 
PEACEFUL PICKETING TO INDUCE PLAINTIFFS, 
WHO OPERATE WTTHOUT OUTSIDE HELP, TO 
JOIN UNION WAS ILLEGAL, ·CONTRARY TO PUB-
LIC POLICY OF THE STATE OF UTAH, AND 
COULD BE ENJOINED. 
CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 37 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
CASES 
Adamson v. U.M.W.A. (Ut.) 277 P. 2d 972-------------------------------- 14 
Baillis v. Fuchs, 283 N.Y. 133, 27 N.E. 2d 812 ... -------------------- 17 
Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. 2d 746, 15'5 P. 2d 343 ________________________ 29 
· 1' Bent Steel Sections v. Doe, (1939) 170 Misc. 736, 10 N.Y.S. 
2d 920 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12 
Boise Street Car Oompany, v. Van Avery, 61 Ida. 502, 103 P. 
2d 1107 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 
Boro Park Sanitary Live Poultry Market v. Heller (1939) 
280 N.Y. 481, 21 N.E. 2d 687.----------------------------------------------- 12 
Browning King ·Co. v. Local195, etc., 111 A. 2nd 415________________ 4 
Building Service Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. p. 541, 70 S. Ct. 
p. 789, 94 L. Ed. 1045 .... --------------------------------------------------------29, 32 
Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees Union (N.Y.) 
22 N .E. 2d 320 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX-(Continued) 
Page 
Cafeteria Employee·s Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 295, 64 S. 
Ct. 127, 88 L. Ed. 58·----------------------------------------------------------------- 30 
Dean v. Mayo, 8 F. Supp. 73------------------------------------------------------------ 17 
Diamond Full-Fashioned Hosiery Company v. Leader (1937 
D. C. Pa.) 20 F. Supp. 467·---------------------------------------------------6, 20 
Dwight's Coffee Shop v. Davis, 206 Misc. 662, 134 N.Y.S. 
2d 847 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 
Fur Workers Union v. Fur Workers Union (1939) 70 App. 
D:C. 122, 105 F. 2d L--------------------------------------------------------------- 12 
Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 74 S. Ct. 16L ___________ 25 
Grace Co. v. Williams, 96 F. 2d 478·----------------------------------------------- 17 
Hanke et al., v. International Brotherhood, etc., 207 P. 2d 
206 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 33 
Hanson v. International Union of Operating Engineers, etc. 
79 So. 2d 199---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26 
International Union of Operating Engineers etc. v. Utah 
Labor Relations Board, 115 Utah 183, 203 P. 2d 404 ________ 33 
Lauf v. E. G. Shinner and Co. (1938) 303 U.S. 323, 82 L. Ed. 
872, 58 S. Ct. 578------------------------------------------------------------------11, 16 
Lee Mark Metal Mfg. Co. v. Local No. 5'96, 30 Lab. Cas. 
69, 968 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 23 
Lilly-Dache, Inc. v. Rose, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 303 ________________________________ 18 
Local Union, etc. v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192, 73 S. Ct. 585 ........ 27, 31 
May's Fur & Ready-to-Wear v. Bauer, 282 N.Y. 331, 26 N.E. 
2d 279 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17 
Mighty Knitting Mills v. Sinensky 151 N.Y.S. 2d 158 
( 1956) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------24,10 
Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 
61 S. Ct. 522, 85 L. Ed. 836·-----------------------------------------------21, 27 
Morris v. Local Union No. 494 of Amalgamated Meat Cutters 
and Butcher Workmen of Spokane et al., 234 P. 2d 543 
(Wash. 1951) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 35 
Potdevin Mach. Co. v. Cicala (1952) 115 N.Y.S. 2d 108............ 8 
Retail Clerks Local v. Your Food Stores, 10 Cir., 225 F. 2d 
65'9 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 24 
Rhode v. Dighton (1939) 27 F. Supp. 149·----------------------------------- 12 
Safeway Stores v. Retail·Clerks, etc., 234 P. 2d 678 ________________ 23 
1' 
i.' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~ :. 
~- ... 'J,,' 
"' 
.l,~ 
j .)~.: 
INDEX-( Continued) 
Pa.ge 
Saito v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, 12 N.Y.S. 2d 283____________ 6 
Sutter v. Amalgamated Ass'n., etc. 252 Ala. 364, 41 So. 2d 
190 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 
Tarr v. Amalgamated Ass'n. of St. Elect. RY. etc. 25'0 P. 
2d 904 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 
United Automobile, etc. Workers v. Wisconsin E.R.B., 351 
U.S. 266, 76 S. Ct. 794------------------------------------------------------------ 21 
United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 
U.S. 62, 100 L. Ed. 941, 76 S. Ct. 1024-------------------------------- 11 
Vogt, Inc., Respondent, v. International Brotherhood, etc. 
74 N.W. 2d 749------------------------------------------------------------------------ 12 
Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Everett Dist. Council, etc., 11 
Wash. 2d 503, 119 P. 2d 643---------------------------------------------------- 18 
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 ________________________ 21, 25 
Woodard et al. v. Collier, et al., 78 S.E. 2d 526 ________________________ 26 
STATUTES 
Civil Practice Act of New York, Sec. 876-a ____________________________ 11, 12 
I.e. Section 44-712---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 
Norris-LaGuardia Act, Sec. 13 (a)------------------------------------------------ 7 
Penn. Labor Relations Act, Sec. 6 (1) (c) ____________________________________ 25 
Taft Hartley Act, Sec. 7 ______________________________________________________________ 13, 29 
U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 34-1-34 ________________________________________ 7,8,9,11,16,26,35 
U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 34-1-2·------------------------------------------------------------------ 9 
U.C.A. 1953, Title 34--------------------------------------------------------------------11, 29 
U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 34-16-2 ------------------------------------------------------------ 19 
Sec. 34-1-23 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 20 
Title 34 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 21 
U .R.C.P ., Rule 65 (a)------------------------------------------------------------------------ 26 
29 U.S.C., Sec. 113 (a)-------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
29 U.S.C.A., Sec. 113 (a)________________________________________________________________ 7 
TEXTS 
A.L.R. 2d p. 381, Sec. 28--------------------------------------------------------------16,17 
A.L.R. 2d p. 382, 383------------------------------------------------------------------------ 18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD D. SUTTON, HARVEY L. 
RANDALL, GALE V. BARNEY, 
and PAUL ANELLA, a co-partner-
_ship, doing business under the name 
and style of BLUE FLAME COAL 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
NICK MARVIDIKIS, FAYE OL-
SEN, CLARON GODLING, MALlO 
PECORELLI, FRANK SACCO, and 
all others engaged in the picketing of 
the coal mine of the Blue Flame Coal 
Co., & UNITED MINE WORKERS 
OF AMERICA, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
C.ase No. 8587 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
AND APPELLANTS 
Defendants will reply to the arguments and observa-
tions made by plaintiffs under the heading "Statement," 
commencing on page 2 of their Brief, and will then reply 
to each point set forth in their Argument in the order in 
which said points appear in said Brief. The figures in 
parentheses refer to the page number of the Record. 
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Since this is an equity ease, and the Supreme Court 
may examine the evidence and make its own findings 
and render judgment in accordance therewith, defend-
ants do not deem it necessary to comment further on 
the trial court';:; evaluation thereof. 
Plaintiffs urge that Walter Odendahl shut the mine 
down not because of antagonism to unions in general, 
or the United Mine Workers of America in particular, 
but because of financial inability to meet the terms of 
the union contract. The evidence discloses that on num-
erous occasions Mr. Odendahl had stated that if the mine 
was unionized he would close it down (255, 269); the 
evidence also shows that before hiring some of the em-
ployees involved, they were specifically asked as to their 
attitude about unionizing the mine, and were cautioned 
that if the mine was unionized, it would be _shut down 
(270). There is reason, therefore, to suspect that 
the mine was shut down, not for the reason given, but 
antagonism to unions in general on the part of Odendahl. 
He had never tried to work under union oontract. De-
fendants offered to show that other mines in tllis area 
comparable to that of Odendahl, "i th sin1ilar haulage and 
other problems were operating profitably under union 
contract, but were precluded from malcing such a show-
ing over plaintiffs' objection (19~-3--1). The evidence 
indicates that financial inability to 1neet a proposed 
union contract is a common exruse used against union 
organization (189). 
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Plaintiffs cite Tarr V. Amalgamated Ass'n of St. 
Elect. Ry, etc. 250 P. 2d 904, to the effect that it is the 
prerogative and constitutional right of any businessman 
to continue or discontinue in business as he sees fit. 
However, this right like so many others, is not absolute. 
It is subject to the qualification that it must be exercised 
in such a manner as not to encroach upon the lawful 
rights of others. 
In the T.arr case, supra, the court laid considerable 
stress upon the proposition that plaintiff had started 
a new city bus service under a new franchize with his 
own equipment, and was not a successor of the defunct 
company. Therefore he was not bound by the union con-
tract, and the dispute which existed on March 9, 1951 
did not therefore survive as a labor dispute against 
plaintiff. It was implied that if the plaintiff had been a 
successor of the defunct company, which formerly oper-
ated the buses, the situation might be different. The 
Court further found there was no labor dispute involved. 
This was a 3 to 2 decision, indicating considerable doubt 
.about the correctness thereof. 
From the dissenting opinion of Justice Porter, we 
quote: 
"Respondent was a successor to the Pocatello 
transit company with full knowledge of the ex-
istence of the labor dispute. By his acquisition of 
the business enterprise employing the involved 
employees, he should not be permitted to extin-
guish the rights of such employees. Sutter V. 
Amalgamated Ass'n, etc. 252 Ala. 364, 41 So. 2d 
190. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
"The dispute between the Pocatello Transfer 
Company and Appellants was a la:bor dispute 
within the me1aning of Section 44-712, I.C. Boise 
Street Car Company, V. Van Avery, 61 Ida. 502, 
103 P. 2d 1107 ... " 
In the case at bar, Mr. Odendahl retained substantial 
financial benefits from the terms and provisions of the 
Lease to plaintiffs (Exh. B). He was to receive a com-
mission from the sale of coal mined, and was therefore 
certainly interested in it being operated. Odendahl also 
has large sums owing him for the equipment and machin-
ery set forth in said lease. He was present with his 
counsel during the entire trial of this case below, and 
was one of the principal witnesses for plaintiffs. In 
view of all these circumstances, it is questionable that 
plaintiffs are starting an entirely new enterprise or are 
the sole parties concerned with this labor dispute. It 
has been held frequently that to move a plant or dis-
continue operations when there is a labor dispute is 
an unfair labor practice. Bro1cniug Kiug Co. V. Local 
195, etc., 111 A. 2nd 415. 
Regarding the question as to whether "\Y alter Oden-
dahl coerced 3 en1plo~~ees into terminating their em-
ploynlent, defendants do not rely entirely upon Pecor-
elli's testimony as plaintiffs try to 1nake it appear. The 
evidence shows Odendahl·s en1ployees were told from 
time to time that if the 1nine was unionized he would 
shut it down and tlmt there would be no work for them; 
that he eould not operate it as a union nline (255, 269). 
As aforesaid, when the mnployees were hired, they were 
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cautioned that unions were not wanted .at the mine and 
that the mine would be shut down if unionized. After 
the men voted to join the union, they did not know 
whether there was further work for them a;t the mine 
in view of said repeated statements made by Mr. Oden-
dahl and his son, Theron Odendahl. Odendahl refused 
to oper.ate the mine even though he was requested to do 
so by a union official pending negotiations for a contract 
( 186). In view of all of said repeated warnings of immi-
nent shut down and loss of jobs in the event of unioniza-
tion, can it be truthfully urged that there was no coercion 
on the part of Mr. Odendahl causing the men to terminate 
their employment~ It is all of these repeated threats 
rather than Pecorelli's testimony alone which should be 
considered on the question of coercion. 
As to whether or not the partnership was bona fide 
or sham, plaintiffs state on page 3 and 4 of the,ir Brief 
that there is no evidence in the Record to controvert 
the existence of the partnership or establish that the 
lease was not bona fide. Of course, it is difficult to read 
a lease ,and discern whether it is bona fide or sham. 
We must examine all the f~acts and circumstances leading 
up to its execution. The fact that the partners other th~ 
Lloyd Sutton, put up no capital investment whatsoever 
and are drawing about the same wage as coal miners 
are paid in Carbon County, and are doing the same work 
as they did before the labor dispute at the mine, and 
that Mr. Sutton was evasive when asked whether or 
not he was going to hire additional employees at a 
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later date, (128-9), all cast doubt on the good faith 
of the entire transaction. See Saito V. Waiters & Wait-
resses Union 12 N.Y.S. 2d 283. 
Plaintiffs assert defendants .apparently have lost 
sight of their antagonist. We are informed it is plain-
tiffs with whom defendants have their quarrel. Plain-
tiffs say they have no employees; that Odendahls who 
formerly operated the mine with employees are no longer 
involved. It is plaintiffs who have missed the point In 
Diamond Full-Fashioned Hosiery Company V. Leader 
(1937 D.C. Pa.) 20 F. Supp. 467, App. Dismd without 
op ( C.A. 3d, 99 F. 2nd 1001), the employer (The V ogne 
Co.) had laid off his employees and had determined 
to go out of business. The employees were advised it 
was being sold. Thereafter the employees and members 
of the union began to picket the mill. Their purpose was 
to inform the public that the employees had been locked 
out and thereby deprived of their employment and that 
the company's machinery was being sold and moved. 
Plaintiff purchased the machinery .and applied for an 
injunclion against the defendants, restraining them from 
interfering with the moving thereof. 
The court said the employees' position was that they 
had been locked out by The Y ogue Company and that 
the court was satisfied from the evidence that the sole 
purpose of the employees in picketing was to get their 
jobs hack; that all the elements of a labor dispute were 
present. The court also said, 
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"Whether the defendants' position was justi-
fied or had any real basis is beside the point 
and is not for this court to pass upon." 
The court held that there was a dispute between defend-
ands and The Vogue Company and that it was a labor 
dispute under the Norris LaGuardia Act. Quoting fur-
ther from the opinion, 
"The further question arises whether a case 
must involve or grow out of a labor dispute be-
tween the plaintiff and defendants to come with-
in the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 
which provides in Section 13 (a) 29 U.S.C. Sec. 
113 (a), 29 U.S.G.A. Sec. 113 (a) that 'A case 
shall be held to involve or grow out of a labor 
dispute when the case involves persons who are 
engaged in the same industry, craft or occupa-
tion ... whether such dispute is ( 1) between one 
or more employers or associations of employers, 
and one or more employees or associations of em-
ployees.' (This language is almost identical with 
34-1-34 U.C.A. 1953 (a). 
"It will be seen that the act includes any case 
where the parties are all engaged in the same 
industry and the dispute is between an employer 
and employees. It is therefore not restricted to 
cases where the dispute is between the plaintiff 
(the buyer of the machinery) and the defendants 
but includes a case where one employer in an 
industry seeks an injunction against the em-
ployees of another employer in the same industry 
who are engaged in a labor dispute with their own 
employer. In this case, the plaintiff is engaged 
in the hosiery industry as are the defendants 
and their employer, The Vogue Co. The case, 
therefore, comes within the express definition of 
the Act and the terms thereof .apply to it." 
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The Court ruled that under the terms of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, the court had no jurisdiction to issue 
a temporary injunction to restrain the defendants from 
'Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved 
in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, 
patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud 
or violence.' See Potdevin Mach. Co. V. Cicala (1952) 
115 N.Y.S. 2d 108; Dwight's Coffee Shop V. Davis, 206 
Misc. 662, 134 N.Y.S. 2d 847. 
Therefore, under the Norris-LaGuardia Act and also 
under Sec. 34-1-34 U.C.A. 1953, and by the authority 
of the cases last quoted and cited, since the plaintiffs 
and defendants are engaged in the same industry, to-wit: 
the coal industry, and the dispute arose between an 
employer, to-wit: the Odendahls, and the employees 
(some of the defendants), the federal or state anti-
injunction act applies. It is not restricted to a dispute be-
tween the plaintiffs and the defendants only. A labor 
dispute exists whenever the e1nployer in an industry 
seeks an injunction against employees of another em-
ployer in the s.an1e industry \dlO are engaged in a labor 
dispute with their own e1nployer. This language would 
mean that if Odendahl .and his en1ployees, smne of the 
defendants herein, are engaged in a labor dispute and 
the plaintiffs herein, to-wit: Lloyd Sutton, et al, seek 
to enjoin the said defendants, there is a labor dispute 
within the me.aning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and 
the Utah Act. It is understandable that the plaintiffs 
would like to narrow the issues as being entirely between 
the plaintiffs and defendants. However, to do so would 
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:r,, be to mis.s the point entirely, (to borrow plaintiffs' 
phrase). Our labor laws· are not that simple to evade 
and circumvent. The Odendahls had a labor dispute with 
their employees, who wanted to negotiate a union con-
tract in order to improve their wages and working con-
IT: ditions, receive medical and hospital benefits, etc. In 
order to evade this labor dispute, Odendahls shut the 
mine down and executed a lease with Sutton and three 
of Odendahl's employees (plaintiffs). Now the plaintiffs 
have obtained a permanent injunction against the picket-
ing he-rein by the defendants. Clearly, under the Leader 
case, supra, a labor dispute existed under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, and 34-1-34 U.C.A. 1953. Both s.aid Fed-
eral and State Acts apply in this situation and an in-
junction cannot be granted. 
Plaintiffs argue that there is no labor dispute in-
volved in the case at bar and cite the definition con-
tained in Section 34-1-2 U.C.A. 1953. However, we call 
the court's attention to a much more complete definition 
of a labor dispute contained in Sec. 34-1-34 U.C.A. 1953, 
which reads as follows : 
"34-1-34. Cases held to involve labor dis-
putes-"Labor dispute," "persons participating or 
interested" defined. - When used in this act, and 
for the purposes of this act. 
"(.a) A case shall be held to involve or grow 
out of a labor dispute when the case involves 
persons who are engaged in a single industry, 
trade, craft, or occupation; or who are employees 
of one employer; or who are members of the same 
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or an affiliated organiza;tion of employers or em-
ployees whether such dispute is (1) between one 
or more employers or associations of employers 
and one or more employees or associations of em-
ployees; ( 2) between one or more employers or 
associations of employers and one or more em-
ployers or associations of employers; or (3) be-
tween one or more employees or association of 
employees and one or more employees or associa-
tions of employees; or when the case involves 
any conflicting or competing interests in a 'labor 
dispute' (as hereinafter defined) of 'persons 
participating or interested' therein (as herein-
after defined). 
(Emphasis mine). 
"(b) A person or association shall be held to 
be a person participating or interested in a labor 
dispute if relief is sought against him or it and 
if he or it is engaged in the industry, trade, craft, 
or occupation in whi0h such dispute occurs, or is 
a member, officer, or agent of any association of 
employers or employees engaged in such industry, 
trade, craft, or occupation. 
" (c) The term 'labor dispute' includes any 
controversy concerning terms or conditions of em-
ploYJ.nent, or concerning the association or repre-
sentation of persons in negotiating, fixing, main-
taining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or 
conditions of employment, or concerning employ-
ment relations, or any other contra versy arising 
ou,t of the respective interests of employer and 
employee, regardless of whether or not the dis-
putants stand in the pro:rimate relation of em-
ployer and employee." (Emphasis mine). 
In lJfighty Kt1itting lJ!ills V. Sinensky 151 N.Y.S. 
2d 158 ( 1956), the court said, 
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"Certainly organizational picketing is war-
ranted if it consists of truthful announcements by 
a labor union whose members are engaged in the 
same trade or occupation as those employed in 
the picketed shop. Such identity of interest gives 
rise to a labor dispute. (Citing cases.) " 
The court in the case immediately above cited also 
s.aid that apart from the protection of Sec. 876-a of the 
Civil Practice Act (of New York) ( which is similar to 
Title 34 U.C.A. 1953), peaceful picketing for organiza-
tional purposes is protected by both federal and state 
constitutions and cite.s cases in support of this proposi-
tion. See Lauf V. E. G. Shinner and Co. (1938) 303 
U.S. 323, 82 L. Ed. 872, 58 S. Ct. 578. The U.S. District 
Court held no labor dispute existed under the federal 
or state law. The injunction granted by the District 
Court was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the District Court 
erred in holding that no dispute existed under the laws 
of Wisconsin (which gives a similar definition of a labor 
dispute as contained in Sec. 34-1-34 U.C.A. 1953). The 
court also held the District Court erred in granting the 
injunction in the .absence of findings which the Norris-
LaGuardia Act makes prerequisite to the exercise of 
jurisdiction. See United Mine Workers V. Arkansas Oak 
Flooring Co. 351 U. S. 62, 100 L. Ed. 941, 76 S. Ct. 1024. 
Where the owners of a theatre were operating the 
theatre without the aid of employees, having discharged 
their sole employee after demand by a labor union that 
he be paid according to the union scale, a labor dispute 
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was held to exist within the meaning of the Norris- II 
LaGuardia Act in Rhode v. Dighton (1939) 27 F. Supp. :!It 
149. See also Fur Workers Union V. Fur Workers Union lw1 
(1939) 70 App. D.C. 122, 105 F. 2d 1. ~ 
Although it appeared no labor dispute existed be- i& 
tween the manufacturer of steel products and its em- i ~u 
ployees, it was held in Bent Steel Sections V. Doe (1939) lj~ 
170 Misc. 736, 10 N.Y.S. 2d 920 that a labor dispute t 
existed within the meaning of Sec. 876""'a of the N.Y. 
Civil Practice Act where the labor union was engaged J. 
in the same "industry, trade, craft, or occupation" as , .. 
that of the manuf;acturers employee.s sought by picket-
ing to unionize such manufacturer's shop, although said 
employees were alleged not to be desirous of joining 
the union. See also Boro Park Sanitary Live Poultry 
Market v. Heller (1939) 280 N.Y. ±81, 21 N.E. 2d 687. 
On p. 6 of Plaintiffs' Brief, it is alleged that the 
picketing herein was coercive in that it W.a$ conducted 
on a highway traveled by scarcely anyone other than 
plaintiffs and the independent truckers hauling coal from 
plaintiffs' mine. Vogt, Inc., Respondent, r. International 
Brotherhood, etc. 74 N.,Y. 2d 749, is cited to the effect 
tha:t picketing under such circmnstances is not the exer-
cise of free speech but coercion. The picketing involved 
in the V ogt case was for the purpose of bringing pres-
sure upon the e1nployer to induce it to eoerce its em-
ployees to join the union. A 'Yisconsin Statute forbade an 
employer to coerce an e1nployee to join the union. There-
fore, the object of the picketing was to induce the employ-
I· 
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er to violate the state law. However, in the case at bar, the 
situation is reversed. All employees of Odendahls joined 
the union and selected defendant union as their bargain-
ing agent, and notified the employer of their action. The 
employer objected and would not bargain collectively. It 
was within the employees' rights under the Federal and 
State Constitutions to join the defendant labor organiza-
tion, as well as under Federal and State Laws, particu-
larly Sec. 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act and Sec. 34-1-7 U.C.A. 
1953. The employer shut the mine down rather than to 
have his employees join the union, and made the an-
nouncement that he could not operate as a union mine. 
If there was any coercion herein, it was on the em-
ployer's part and not the employees. The latter were 
willing to bargain collectively with the employer but 
the employer was unwilling. There is no analogy be-
tween the situation in the Vogtt case and the ca.se at b.ar. 
Furthermore, the picketing involved in the present case 
was on the only highway or ro·ad leading to the mine. 
It was a public highway. It was not upon a rural road 
where an exceedingly small number of possible patrons 
of the owners' might pass as in Vogt. All patrons of 
plaintiffs had to pass this highway in order to get to 
the plaintiffs' mine, since it was the only road leading 
thereto, as alleged in the complaint .and found by the 
trial court. This road leads to the only airport in the 
county and to other mines in the vicinity. It was often 
traveled by people testing out cars as mentioned in the 
Record. 
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Plaintiffs on p. 7 argue that the picketing herein 
was enmeshed in violence-the blowing up of the bridge 
and the spreading of roofing nails on the only road to 
plaintiffs' mine. Plaintiffs admit there is no direct proof 
as to who was responsible for said conduct. We pointed 
out in our first Brief that the court made no finding 
as to who was responsible for this conduct and could 
not do so, as there was no evidence on this point. 
Adamson v. U.M.W.A. (Ut.) 277 P. 2d 972. Injunction 
is a harsh and drastic remedy. It can not be based 
upon presumption nor suspicion. We may theorize plain-
tiffs committed these acts as a foundation for injunctive 
proceedings. We do not wish to engage in a guessing 
game with the plaintiffs as to who committed the wrong-
ful acts. Suffice it to say that mere speculation, conjec-
ture, suspicion, and presumption, are not the proper 
bases upon which to predicate such a harsh and drastic 
remedy as injunction. There must be competent proof 
of continuing and violent acts on the part of the defend-
ants in order to justify any injunction whatsoever. There 
is no such proof in this case. Any alleged violent 
acts must be committed in the course of the picketing. The 
act of a lone defendant Faye Olsen 19 days after the 
picketing had entirely tenninated w.as not in the course 
of the picketing, is not chargeable to the other defendants 
herein, and has no connection with the picketing. We 
have dwelt upon these n1atters in our first Brief and 
direct the court's attention thereto. (Brief p. 33 et seq.). 
There is no showing that the language used by the 
pickets threatened any violence whatsoever to .anyone. 
' . 
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We have argued this matter in our first Brief. We simply 
call attention here to the testimony of Mr. Sutton where--
in he stated he was never threatened with bodily injury 
by the pickets ( 122) and also that he "wasn't going to 
take the chance" (of going through the picket line) ( 122). 
The purpose of the picketing was not to deny the 
plaintiffs the right to work on account of their non-
membership in a labor union. The evidence discloses that 
neither Odendahls nor the plaintiffs were ever requested 
to cease operating their mine during the picketing. In 
fact, Mr. Odendahl was specifically requested by Pecor-
elli to continue his ope~ations pending a union contract. 
Plaintiffs were likewise never asked to cease operations. 
The purpose of the picketing w;as to protect the jobs of 
the 5 employees who did not join with Sutton in the 
partnership. They were the ones who were denied the 
right to work because they wanted to join the union, for 
the purpose of improved wages, working conditions, and 
other union benefits. It is the employees who have the 
right to work whether or not they belong to a labor 
union. These employees signed up to belong to said 
union and consequently lost their jobs because of union 
activity. 
The defendants have replied to the matters alleged 
under the title "Statement" in Plaintiffs' Brief. We now 
address ourselves to replying to the Argument of Plain-
tiffs and the points discussed thereunder, in the order 
the same appear in Plaintiffs' Brief. 
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PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE AN 
INJUNCTION IN 'THIS CASE REGARDLESS OF THE FED-
ERAL LAW. 
Under sub point I it is alleged that a state court 
has jurisdiction in labor cases involving interstate com-
merce notwithstanding the F~eral Labor Relations 
Management Act when either of the following situations 
prevail: (1) whenever the picketing or labor dispute 
involves or results in violation of local matters of public 
safety and order such as violence, threats, blocking of 
highways or violations of declared public policy, or (2) 
whenever the National Labor Relations Board under 
its "yard stick" jurisdiction promulgation of 195± refuses 
to take jurisdiction. 
Replying to Point I, we point out that some courts 
have denied injunctive relief under an anti-injunction 
statute, such as Title 3-!, Ch. 1, U.C.A. 1953 and others 
have held injunctions to be barred under such circum-
stances except upon compliance with all of the procedural 
provisions relative to the issuance of injunctions in labor 
disputes, thereby recognizing the applicability of anti-
injunction acts even in cases which involve violence. 29 
A.L.R. 2d p. 381, et seq, Sec. ~S. Lauf r. E. G. Slz inner 
and Co. (1938), 303 U.S. ~i~3, 8~ L. Ed. 87:2, 58 S. Ct. 578. 
The U. S. Suprmne Court held in the Lauf ease that a 
labor dispute existed barring the issuance of an injunc-
tion, although it appe1ared that the union by nwlestation, 
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annoyance, threats, and intimidation had prevented 
patrons from entering the plaintiffs' market. See Grace 
Co. V. Williams 96 F. 2nd 478, affirming 20 F. Supp. 
263; Dean V. Mayo 8 F. Supp. 73. 
29 A.L.R. 2nd p. 381, Sec. 28 states, 
"It has been held in other CJases that while 
the violence may be restrained an anti-injunction 
act will preclude an injunction against all picket-
ing." 
Cases cited to support the quoted text are May's Fur 
& Ready-To-W ear V. Bauer 282 N.Y. 331, 26 N.E. 2d 
279 modifying 255 App. Div. 643, 8 N.Y.S. 2d 819, re-
hearing denied 282 N.Y. 804, 27 N.E. 2d 210; Baillis V. 
Fuchs 283 N.Y. 133, 27 N.E. 2d 812, modifying 258 App. 
Div. 919, 16 N.Y.S. 2d 724. 
In Baillis V. Fuchs, supra, an injunction was 
ordered modified so as to strike out all provisions ex-
cept those restraining violence and breach of the peace. 
The court held that while the power of the courts to 
enjoin the violence in a labor dispute existed, even under 
the anti-injunction Act, this power could not be used 
to authorize a prohibition of all picketing, except upon 
a specific finding that peaceful picketing was impossible. 
In the case at har, the trial court's permanent in-
junction restrained and enjoined "all picketing," with-
out finding that peaceful picke~ting was :impossible. 
Peaceful, as well as, violent picketing is thereby re-
strained. Defendants have consistently taken the posi-
tion that if the picketing involved herein was found to 
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be violent the court should have enjomed only the vio-
lent .acts and not in sweepmg terms prohibited all picket-
ing. See Lilly-Dache, Inc. V. Rose 28 N.Y.S. 2d 303; 
Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. V. Everett Dist. Council, etc. 
11 Wash. 2d 503, 119 P. 2d 643. 
We direct the court's attention to the dissenting 
opmion in Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees 
Union (N.Y.) 22 N.E. 2d 320, wherein Judge Lehman 
argued that while the majority had stated that the effect 
of the anti-injunction statute was to prevent courts from 
enjoining peaceful picketing, they had failed, by their 
affirmance of the decree barring all picketing, to give 
effect to the statute, and he contended that in the absence 
of a definite finding that the violence had been so great 
that peaceful picketing was entirely out of the question, 
the decree should have been modified to permit peaceful 
picketing. This is consistent with the cases heretofore 
cited and, in our. opinion, is the better rule. The other 
0ases cited in 29 A.L.R. 2d pages 382 .and 383, wherein 
injunctions were granted, appear to us to be distinguish-
able on the ground that there ·was n1ass picketing in-
volved, or peaceful picketing was ilnpossible, or the acts 
of the union may have had an unlawful objective, none 
of which ,are present in the case at bar. 
Plaintiffs allege the picketing herein was in viola-
tion of the declared public policy of the State of Utah 
as expressed by its legislature in the Utal1 Right to 'York 
Law. We find nothing in said statute which deprives em-
ployees of their right to picket for organizational pur-
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poses or to protect their jobs when the employer shuts 
a mine down to keep it from being organized, and refuse·s 
to bargain with the employees or their representatives. 
The public policy expressed in Section 34-16-2 (Utah 
Right To Work Law) reads: 
"It is hereby declared to be the public policy 
of the state of Utah that the right of persons to 
work, whe,ther in private employment or for the 
state of Utah ... shall not be denied or abridged 
on account of membership or non-membership 
in .any labor union ... ; further, that the right to 
live includes the right to work. The exercise of the 
right to work must be protected and maintained 
free from undue restraints and coercion." (My 
emphasis.) 
Plaintiffs have not shown there was undue restraint 
and coercion present in the case at bar, but have appar-
ently taken the attitude that any coercion or restraint 
whatsoever is subject to an injunction. As aforesaid, it 
was defendant employees who were deprived of their 
right to work because of union activities. They were 
picketing to get their jobs back and for their right to 
belong to the union, to work as union men at the mine 
and for mutual aid ·.and protection, etc. Sec. 34-16-6, 
U.C.A. 1953 (Utah Right to Work L.aw) exempts "peace-
ful and orderly solicitation and persuasion by members 
of a labor union, labor organization or any other type 
of association of others to join a labor union . . . un-
accompanied by any intimidation, use of force ... etc." 
From the above language, there is nothing denying peace-
ful picketing for lawful labor objectives. The situation 
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in the case at bar is the employer did not want his em-
ployees to belong to a labor union and did not want the 
mine unionized. In our. opinion, the Record clearly es- _._ 
tablishes this fact. When Odendahl shut the mine down, 
to prevent unionization thereof, under the theory of some 
of the courts and authorities we have examined, said .ac-
tion was similar to a lockout. See Diamond Full Fashion-
ed Hosiery Co. v. Leader, supra. 
The public policy of this State regarding labor dis-
putes is set forth in Sec. 34-1-23 U.C.A. 1953 as follows: 
"Public Policy declared. In the interpreta-
tion and application of this act, the public policy 
of this state is declared as follows : 
"Negotiations of terms and conditions of 
labor. should result from voluntary agreement be-
twe:en employer and employee. Governmental 
authority has permitted and encouraged em-
ployers to organize in the corporate and other 
forms of capital control. In dealing ·with such 
employers the individual unorganized worker is 
helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and 
to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to 
obtain acceptable terms and conditions of enlploy-
ment. Therefore it is necessarY that the indiYidual 
workman have full freedmn ~f association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives 
of his own choosing to negotiate the terms and 
conditions of his einploJlnent, and that he shall 
be free from the interference, restraint or coer-
cion of e1nployers of labor, or their agents, in 
the designation of such representatiYes or in 
self-organization or in other concerted activities 
for the purpose of collective bargaining or their 
mutual aid or protection." 
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The plaintiffs have taken the position that if there 
is a conflict between Title 34 U.C.A. 1953 and the Utah 
Right To Work Law, the latter should prevail because it 
is the latest pronouncement of the legislative policy of 
this State. We find no such conflict between the two 
acts. Title 34 contains, among other things, certain rules 
to be followed in labor disputes, and the Utah Right To 
vV ork Act provides thiat no one shall be compelled to be-
long or not to belong to a labor union as a condition of 
employment, or continuation of employment. 
The employees in the case at bar had a right to be-
long to a union and the Utah Right To Work Law does 
not take away this right. They had a right to lawfully 
picket an employer who refused to permit them to work 
because of union activities. 
Violence on a picket line which is isolated or episodic 
does not warrant an injunction. See Milk Wagon Drivers 
v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 61 S. Ct. 522, 85 
L. Ed. 836; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468. 
Plaintiffs cite United Automobile, etc. Workers v. 
Wisconsin E.R.B., 351 U.S. 266, 76 S. Ct. 794 to the effect 
that the general rule that a state may not, in the further-
ance of its public policy, enjoin conduct which has been 
made an unfair labor practice under the federal statutes, 
did not take from the states power to prevent mass 
picketing, violence, and overt thre1ats of violence. 
It is still axiomatic that each ca;:;e must be decided 
upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances. This is 
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perhaps the reason that some decisions of the various 
courts appe1ar to be in conflict with other decisions of the 
same courts. In the United Automobile Workers case, !· 
the State Board of Wisconsin found that the appellants' 
members had engaged in mass picketing, thereby ob-
structing ingre_ss to and egress from the Kohler plant; 
interferred with the free and uninterrupted use of public 
ways; prevented persons desiring to be employed by 
Kohler from entering the plant; and coerced employees 
who desired to work, and threatened them and their 
families with physical injury. The State Board issued 
an order directing the union to cease the said unlawful 
activities. The Board .also ordered that the number of 
pickets be limited. 
It will be noted that the order of the State Board 
which was sustained by the U.S. Supreme Court did not 
forbid nor prohibit "all picketing," but only the specific 
violent acts of which complaint u·as rnade and which 
were found to exist. The U.S. Supreme Court said, 
"We hold that \Visconsin may enjoin the vio-
lent union conduct here involved." (Not all picket-
ing.) 
This case is not authority for the proposition ad-
vanced by the plaintiffs that the trial court should have 
enjoined all picketing or had the right to do so. The 
conduct in the case just cited was certainly extreme vio-
lence and w.as found to be such, but the State Board and 
United States Supreme Court saw fit to restrain only the 
violent acts and threats involved and did not lay down a 
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rule that all picketing must cease, such as the trial court 
ordered in the case at bar in its permanent injunction 
from which this appeal is taken. The authority cited 
upholds defendants' contention that the injunction in the 
case at bar is too sweeping and too broad in that it en-
joins "all picketing," and not merely the violent conduct, 
if such there was. See Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks, 
etc., 234 P. 2d 678, hear gr by sup ct modg (Cal. Super 
ct) 18 CCH Lab Gas 65, 735. 
Unde,r situation no. (2), plaintiffs argue that if fed-
eral jurisdiction exists, and if the N.L.R.B. refuses to ex-
ercise jurisdiction in a labor dispute, state jurisdiction 
is proper in a case effecting interstate commerce. Lee 
Mark Metal Mfg. Co. v. Local No. 596, 30 Lab. Cas. 69, 
968 is cited. In the Lee Mark case, it should be noted 
that the stated objective of the pickets was ·to close down 
the plant even though it meant causing the employees to 
be thrown out of work. The pickets are qunted as saying 
"We don't give 1a damn about them ( e,mployees). We are 
after you (the employer). We want to close your place." 
One employee w.as informed by the pickets that a truck 
would be blown up and several employees were warned by 
the pickets to stay off the trucks or they would be in-
jured. Police protection had to be invoked by the plain-
tiff, but apparently to no av:ail. The facts of the Lee 
Mark 0ase are in marked contrast with the facts in the 
case at bar. In the present case, the pickets were trying 
to protect their jobs, not to close down the plant and 
throw the employees out of work. No threats were made 
of blowing up any facilities. In fact, defendants wanted 
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the employer to continue operating, not to close down. 
No police protection was found necessary in the ease at 
bar, because ~there was no violence or threats requiring 
the same. The Record discloses that plaintiff Sutton told 
Deputy Sheriff Semken that if any trouble arose he would 
notify the Sheriff's Office thereof (290). No such noti-
fication to his knowledge was ever received (290). Fur-
thermore, the threats and violence in the Lee Mark case 
were continuing rather than isolated .and episodic. 
In Mighty Knitting Mills v. Sinensky, supra, the 
court said after the argmnent of the motion for a tempo-
rary injunction, it became known that the N.L.R.B. de-
clined to take action of defendants charge of unfair 
labor practice. The Court said, 
"It is not for this court to speculate that the 
declination was due to rejection of the claim of 
unfair labor practice or to a finding that plain-
tiff's newly formed business has not yet developed 
a sufficient 'jurisdictional yard stick' or an inter-
state character .. Ullquestionably, the Board~s re-
jection of the charge does n.ot conclusively negate 
its own jurisdiction. (Emphasis n1ine.) Retail 
Clerks Local v. Your Food Stores, 10 Cir., 2:?5 F. 
2d 659 ... " 
From the cited portion of the courts opinion above, 
it would appear that merely because the N.L.R.B. declines 
to act on .an unfair labor prartire eharge, does not con-
clusively oust the board of jurisdiction or confer jurisdic-
tion upon the state courts. The l\lighty I~nitting :Mills 
case, supra, was decided in 1956. 
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In Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485,74 S. Ct. 
161 and Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 
both cited by the plaintiffs on page 13, we point out that 
in neither case was there any mention made of any speci-
fic amount of interstate commerce which was necessary 
to be involved before the N.L.R.B. had jurisdiction. It 
is defendants' position that if an act effects interstate 
commerce, this is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction 
of the federal Board and the States do not have juris-
diction. In the Garner case, supra, the court simply stated 
the trucking operations of the employer formed .a link 
to an interstate railroad. No controversy, labor dispute, 
or strike was in progress, and at no time had petitioners 
objected to their employees joining the union. The union 
was picketing to induce the employees of the trucking 
company to join them to gain union wages, hours and 
working conditions. Even though the courts below found 
that respondents' purpose in picketing was to coe:rce peti-
tioners into compelling or influencing their employees 
to join the union .and the equity court below held that 
respondents' conduct violated the Penn. Labor Relations 
Act, Sec. 6 (1) (c), providing that it was an unfair labor 
practice for an employer by discrimination in regard to 
hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition 
of employment, to encourage or discourage membership 
in any labor organization, yet it was held by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Garner that state remedies were pre-
cluded, because the federal board had exclusive juris-
diction in the matter. (Note that the Penn. Statute al-
legedly violated by the union contains almost the s.ame 
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wording as the Utah Right To Work Law). The U.S 
Supreme Court, as well as the Pennsylvania Court held 
that the grievance was not subject to litigation in the 
state's tribunals. 
The power of the legislature to limit district courts 
in the issuing of injunctions as it has done in Sec. 34-1-34 
U.C.A. 1953, is constitutional. The legislature has simply 
stated that a court must find certain f~acts to exist before 
an injunction can be issued. It does not take away any 
right to issue .an injunction where the proper require-
ments are met. We have other rules or statutes which 
state conditions or grounds which must exist before an 
injunction may ,be granted, to-wit: Rule 65 (A) U.R.C.P. 
Are these rules or statutes void, simply because the 
constitution mentions the right of the District Courts 
to issue writs of injunotion Y 
Plaintiffs cite Hanson v. International Union of 
Operating Engineers, etc. 79 So. 2d 199 to the effect that 
peaceful picketing, for an unlawful purpose, that is, in 
contravention of the right to work policy of the State, 
can be le~ally enjoined. Also Woodard et al. v. Collier, 
et al., 78 S.E. 2d 526. 
In the Hanson case, supra, a road contractor brought 
suit again the union for injunction where the ro.ad con-
tractor had all jobs filled, and it was impossible for him 
to hire local re,sidents, who were me~nbers of the labor 
union, as desired by the union, unless the contractor 
either violated the Right To Work Bill by discharging 
his non-union employees or hired local residents, who 
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were members of the union, when the contractor had no 
need for .additional employees; the picke,ting by the union 
to compel the contractor to hire local residents was held 
by the court to be for an unlawful purpose and would 
be enjoined. There is no such unlawful purpose in the 
case at bar. The defendants did not picket in the present 
case in order to cause the discharge of any employees of 
the Odendahls or plaintiffs. They picketed to protect their 
own jobs and for organizational purposes. There was no 
violation of the Utah Right to Work Law involved. 
It is interesting to note that in the Hanson case, the 
defendant therein complained of the broad extent of the 
injunction, as the defendants have done herein. The de-
fendant in Hanson claimed that the injunction should 
have been limited to picketing "which has for its purpose 
to force the employer to diS'charge non-union men or to 
require him to employ only and exclusively union men." 
The court, after citing Milk Wagon Drivers Union, etc. 
v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., supra, and Building Serv-
ice Employees, etc. v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 70 S. Ct. 
784, 788, 94 L. Ed. 1045, and Justice Dougl.as' dissenting 
opinion in Local Union, etc. v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192, 73 
S. Ct. 585, concluded, 
"We believe that there is merit in defendant's 
complaint as to the breadth and scope of the in-
junction decree in this case and that :it should be 
limited to the specific violation of the State law. 
Of course, this would still allow picketing for the 
purposes enumerated in (.a), (b), (c), (Stipulation 
of fact) and even though peaceful, might have 
the same effect insofar as economic pressure on 
the plaintiff is concerned. 
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"It might be argued that the practical effect 
of this decision is to void the injunction. May we 
again reiterate that it must be remembered that 
courts are bound by the law and in such a case as 
the one at bar only such picketing as has for its 
object an unlawful purpose may be enjoined and 
such an injunction under the jurisprudence must 
be •tailored to prevent a specific violation of the 
State law and cannot be so broad as to prevent 
all picketing and particularly that which is done 
for a lawful purpose." (Emphasis mine.) 
In accordance with the above, the court enjoined only 
the picketing which was in specific violation of the state 
law. This is what defendants have been contending for in 
the case at bar, to-wit: that all picketing should not have 
been enjoined herein and if there is found to be picketing 
in violation of .any statute or for any particular illegal 
purpose, only the illegal picketing should be enjoined. 
POINT III 
THE PICKETING HEREIN WAS NOT PEACEFUL, AND 
WAS FOR AN UNLAWFUL PURPOSE. 
It is defendants' position that whether or not the 
picketing was peaceful or Yiolent has been adequately 
argued in defendants' first Brief. \Y e shall not burden 
the court with further argmnent on this point. \Y e be-
lieve the same is true as to the isolated .act of defendant 
Faye Olsen, which is again Inentioned under Point III 
of plaintiffs' brief. 
Plaintiffs' argun1ent that the picketing was illegal 
conduct under the Utah Right To \Vork Law can not be 
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sustained. The picketing herein w.as for organizational 
purposes, to protect the jobs of the defendants, and was 
an exercise of the rights of the defendants under Sec. 7 
of the Taft-Hartley Act, and Title 34 U.C.A. 1953. No 
one was denying or abridging plaintiffs right to work 
on account of membership or non-membership in any 
labor union, etc. There were no undue restraints .and 
coercion. The right to work, is subject always to eco-
nomic pressures on the part of unions for better wages 
and working conditions. See Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. 
2d 7 46, 155 p 0 2d 343. 
In Building Service Employees Int. Union v. Gazz-
am, 339 U.S. 532, 70 S. Ct. 784, cited by plaintiffs for 
the proposition that a state is permitted to enjoin pe.ace-
ful picketing which is in violation of the states public 
policy, the picketing was carried on for the purpose of 
compelling an employer to sign a contract with a labor 
union which coerced his employees choice of a bargain-
ing representative. This is exactly the reverse of the 
situation presented in the case at bar, where the employ-
ees had voluntarily and freely selected the United Mine 
W orker.s of America as its bargaining agent and had so 
notified the employer, who refused to barg.ain with or to 
recognize the collective bargaining agent so chosen by 
his employees. Defendants did not coerce the employees' 
choice of a bargaining agent as was the case in Gazzam. 
The U.S. Supreme Court said th.at picketing of an em-
ployer to compel him to coerce his employees' choice of 
a bargaining representative is an attempt to induce 
transgression of the states policy, and it was not for that 
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tribunal to judge the wisdom of such state policy. Quot-
ing further from Gazz.am: 
"The Washington Statute has not been con-
strued by the Washington courts in this case to 
prohibit picketing of workers by other workers. 
The construction of the statute which we are re-
viewing only prohibits coercion of workers by em-
ployers. We can not agree with petitioners' read-
ing of this injunction that 'whatever types of 
picketing were to· be carried out by the union 
would be in violation of the decree.' Respondent 
does not contend that picketing per se has been 
enjoined but only that picketing which has as its 
purpose violation of the policy of the State. There 
is no contention that picketing directed at em-
ployees for organization purposes would be vio-
lative of that policy. The decree does not have 
that effect." (Emphasis mine.) 
And further: 
" ... We therefore find no unwarranted re-
straint of picketing here. The injunction granted 
was tailored to prevent a specific violation of an 
important state law. The decree was limited to 
the wrong being perpetrated, namely, 'an abusive 
exercise of the right to picket.' Cafeteria Em-
ployees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. at page 295, 
64 S. Ct. at page 127,88 L. Ed. 58 .... " 
Note that in the Gazzam case, the injunction was to 
forbid the act of an employer to coerce his employees 
into joining the union. It did not prohibit "all picketing" 
such as was done by the trial court in the case at bar. 
The U.S. Supreme Court calls attention to the fact that 
the pieketing "was tailored to meet the specific" situation 
in Gazzam. That is all defendants are asking in this 
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case in the event it should be found that any injunction 
was warranted, ~ather than prohibition of all picketing. 
The Marcus Heath case cited by plaintiffs appears to be 
the wrong citation. We have not as yet been able to lo-
cate this case. 
The last case cited by pl~aintiffs under Point III is 
Local Union No. 10 et al., v. Graham, et al., supra. The 
facts in Graham are at great variance with the facts here-
in. The complaint in Graham alleged that respondents 
had begun work under their contract with the City to 
build a school; that early completion thereof was urgent; 
that respondents had made contracts with all necessary 
subcontractors; that some of the subcontractors employ-
ed only union labor while others employed non-union 
as well as union labor; that in July certain of the de-
fendants had requested that all non-union labor on the 
project be laid off and had said that, unless that was 
done 'every effort would be made to prevent any union 
labor employed ... on that project from continuing work 
thereon'; that certain defendants had picketed the project 
and as a result thereof union members on the job had 
refused to continue work there and that therefore the 
project had "slowed to a standstill." It was alleged that 
the objectives of the defendants in making such demands 
and conducting such picketing were to prevent non-union 
employees from working on the project. The Court found 
that the picketing was for aims, purposes and objectives 
in conflict with the provisions of the Right To Work 
Laws of the State of Virginia and therefore illegal, and a 
permanent injunction was issued. In the case at bar the 
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mine was voluntarily shut down by the employer, then 
leased to the plaintiffs, even though both were told that 
the defendants would prefer to have the mine continue 
to operate pending negotiations for a union contract. 
None of the defendants was trying to have any non-union 
members discharged from employment or to cause the 
mine to be shut down. While the conduct in the Graham 
case violated Virginia's Right To Work Act, the organi-
zational picketing of the defendants in the case at bar 
was legal and not in conflict with the Right to Work 
Law of Utah. 
Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion points 
out there were no specific findings by the Virginia Court 
and stated he believed the case should be remanded to 
make specific findings. Justice Douglas further said, 
"If Virginia is to enjoin this form of free 
speech, I would require her to show precisely the 
{. 
I 
li 
i!C 
'IT 
reasons for it. Unless we are meticulous in that :". 
regard, great rights will be lost by the absence 
of findings, by the generality of findings, or by 
the vagueness of decrees. There is more than sus-
picion that that has happened here. For the de-
cree permanently enjoins defendants 'from carry-
ing on their picketing or other activities in front 
of or around' the construction site. This decree 
was not 'tailored to prel'ent a specific violation' 
of state law. Building Service Union v. G.azzam, 
supra, 339 U.S. at page 541, 70 S. Ct. at page 789, 
94 L. Ed. 1045. It is a broadside against all pick-
eting, the kind of general assault condemned by 
Thornhill v. State of Alabama, supra. It illus-
trates the evil consequences that flow from a 
fail1tre to be utterly painstaking in isolating the 
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precise evils in picketing which the state may 
regulate." (My emphasis.) 
Justice Douglas lends additional strength to the validity 
of defendants' argument in the case at bar that the de-
cree herein prohibiting "all picketing" was entirely too 
broad and sweeping, and should be reversed. 
POINT IV 
NOT ALL PE.kCEFUL PICKETING IS THE LEGITI-
MATE EXEitCISE OF FREE SPEECH, AND PEACEFUL 
PICKETING TO INDUCE PLAINTIFFS, WHO OPERATE 
WITHOUT OUTSIDE HELP, TO JOIN UNION WAS IL-
LEGAL, CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH, AND COULD BE ENJOINED. 
Plaintiffs, as did defendants, cite International 
Union of Operating Engineers etc. v. Utah Labor Rela-
tions Board, 115 Utah 183, 203 P. 2d 404. In our first 
Brief, defendants commented on this case. We see noth-
ing in it which is contrary to our position herein. We 
believe the Utah case contains a good statement of the 
law and recognizes the right of free speech, with its 
proper limitations as well as the right of picketing as 
free speech, also with reasonable limitations. 
Let us analyze Hanke et al. v. International Brother-
hood, etc., 207 P. 2d 206 cited by plaintiffs on page 26 
of their brief. The facts are set forth briefly by plain-
tiffs. The real basis of the decision appears to be stated 
on page 213 of 207 P. 2d. After reviewing the facts in 
Bakery and Pastry Driver and Helpers, etc. v. Wahl, 
the Washington court states, 
"The facts of the case at bar present no such 
appealing picture in favor of the appellants. Local 
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882, on whose behalf appellant Local 309 set up 
the picket line in front of the respondents' place 
of business, represents the used car salesmen 
in the Seattle area. Of 115 such concerns, only 
10 employ any help at all, the remainder being 
operated exclusively by their proprietors. From 
this fact the conclusion seems irresistable that the 
unions interest in the welfare of a mere handful 
of members (of whose working conditions no 
complaint at all was made) is far outweighed by 
the interests of individual proprietors and the 
people of the community as a whole, to the end 
that little businessmen and property owners shall 
be free from dictation as to business policy by an 
outside group having but a relatively small and 
indirect interest in such policy." 
Thus what the Washington Court did in the Hanke 
case was to try to balance respondents' right to do busi-
ness, free from unreasonable interference, with appel-
lants' rights to freedom of speech, recognizing that 
neither of said rights is absolute, in the sense that it may 
be exercised in utter disregard of the other. Because 
only 10 out of 115 .automobile concerns in the area af-
fected employed outside help, the court decided that 
the interests of the overwhelming majority of the dealers 
was of greater importance than to protect the handful 
of men who were employed. 
The situation is exactly the reverse in Carbon 
County where the case at bar arose. The Record dis-
closes that the overwhelming majority of the miners in 
Carbon County are affiliated with unions. By compari-
son to the total, the non-union men employed in the 
mines are a mere handful. Therefore, adopting the rea-
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soning of the Hanke case, the interests of the overwhelm-
ing majority of the union men in the mines who are inter-
ested in maintaining decent wages and working condi-
tions, medical and hospital benefits, should far outweigh 
the mere handful of said individuals not belonging to a 
union, who work for lower wages, longer hours and 
without medical and hospital benefits, all of which tend 
to lower the living standard of the workers. 
Furthermore, the Hanke case does not present a situ-
ation such as this court has before it, where employees 
who were gainfully employed sought to organize a union 
and then were faced with a shutdown and then a lease of 
the mine, whereupon they picketed for organizational 
purposes and to exercise their rights under feder.al and 
state statutes. 
The authorities cited by plaintiffs commencing with 
Morris v. Local Union No. 494 on page 29 of plaintiffs' 
Brief and including page 31 thereof, have been cited in 
the forepart of plaintiffs' brief and, in our opinion, the 
same have been fully analyzed and distinguished. 
In order to clarify defendants' position relative to 
the picketing herein, it is our contention (1) that the 
picketing herein grew out of a labor dispute under the 
definitions contained in the Norris-LaGuardia Act and 
also Sec. 34-1-34 U.C.A. 1953, in that the same arose after 
all of the employees of the Odendahls freely and volun-
tarily agreed to join the union, selected the defendant 
United Mine Workers of America as their bargaining 
agent, and so notified their employer. Under both Fed-
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eral and State anti-injunction Acts, since the dispute in-
volved was a labor dispute, the trial court did not have 
jurisdiction to issue an injunction .at all; (2) that the 
picketing took place after the Odendahls shut the mine 
down, which action amounted to a lockout; that after 
the picketing started Odendahls, in order to circumvent 
and evade the labor dispute, leased the mine to plaintiff 
Sutton and three of their former employees; that all 
plaintiffs had full knowledge and notice of the labor 
dispute and by taking over the mine when said dispute 
was still unresolved and by continuing the same hostile, 
anti-union policy as their predecessors, assumed and 
adopted the said labor dispute; (3) that the picketing 
was to protect the jobs of said employees and to organ-
ize the mine and derive the benefits of higher wages, im-
proved working conditions, etc., and not for the purpose 
of coercing the plaintiffs themselves into joining the 
union or to deny them the right to work; that there was 
no violence on the picket line and that if it can be said 
that any of the conduct or words used by the pickets were 
in the nature of threats, that the srune were isolated and 
episodic and not continuous and therefore did not justify 
an injunction against all picketing; that the picketing 
was not enmeshed in violence to the extent required by 
the authorities to w.arrant restraining all picketing; that 1 -
it cannot be said that peaceful picketing under the cir-
cumstances could not haYe continued; that under the au-
thorities referred to in our first brief and herein, unless 
the violent condnet is so en1neshed in the picketing that 
peaeeful pieketing is in1possible and unless the court 
finds that such is the case, the injunction should enjoin 
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only the unlawful and violent act.s, if such there were, 
and not "all picketing." 
We emphasize that injunction is a drastic and harsh 
remedy. In this case it involves the important constitu-
tional right of free speech under both Federal and State 
Constitutions; that before a trial court is justified in 
permanently enjoining "all picketing," which of neces.sity 
includes peaceful picketing, it should find that peaceful 
picketing is impossible under the circumstances. We 
submit that under the Record the trial court in this case 
could not find and did not find that peaceful picketing 
was impossible. Therefore, it committed error in en-
joining "all picketing." 
CONCLUSION 
We urge thi.s court to find the facts against the plain-
tiffs and in favor of the defendants and to reverse the 
judgment of the trial court. If this court, after its usual 
careful and thorough consideration of the facts and the 
law herein is not disposed to completely reverse the trial 
court, then, in such event, defendants pray that this 
court modify the trial court's injunction by deciding that 
only the illegal conduct, if any has been shown, should 
have been enjoined, rather than "all picketing," which 
necessarily includes peaceful picketing. Peaceful picket-
ing should not have been enjoined. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD SHEYA 
Counsel for Appellants 
Bonomo Building 
Price, Utah 
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